Sunday Essay 21 | 2026
The Return of Great-Power Management
SUNDAY ESSAYS
5/17/2026
One of the clearest transformations taking place in international politics today is not simply the return of rivalry between major powers, but the return of direct great-power management as the mechanism through which instability is increasingly handled. Over the past week, global attention centred heavily on the Trump–Xi summit, yet the significance of the meeting extended far beyond diplomatic symbolism or the optics of two leaders attempting to project stability during a period of heightened global tension. What mattered more was what the summit revealed about the structure of the international system itself. Iran, Taiwan, trade, artificial intelligence, shipping security, technology restrictions and energy flows were all folded into the same strategic conversation. Issues that once might have been treated separately are increasingly interconnected within broader negotiations over leverage, influence and stability between major powers. That shift reflects something deeper than diplomatic coordination. It reflects an international environment in which crises no longer remain compartmentalised. Instead, geopolitical competition increasingly overlaps across economic systems, technological infrastructure, military positioning and strategic geography simultaneously.
For much of the post–Cold War era, there was a broad assumption that globalisation and economic interdependence would gradually reduce the importance of direct power balancing between states. Competition certainly continued, but it was often moderated through institutions, markets and multilateral frameworks designed to absorb tension before it escalated into systemic instability. The expectation was not that rivalry would disappear entirely, but that interdependence itself would create incentives strong enough to preserve broad stability. Markets became deeply integrated, supply chains expanded globally, and technological systems connected states together with unprecedented speed. The dominant assumption across much of the international order was that interconnectedness itself would gradually constrain geopolitical fragmentation because the economic costs of instability would simply become too high for major powers to sustain. That assumption now appears significantly weaker. What is emerging instead is a world where major powers increasingly manage instability directly because institutional mechanisms appear less capable of containing overlapping crises independently. The Trump–Xi summit reflected this reality clearly. Publicly, both Washington and Beijing framed the meeting around stability, cooperation and diplomatic engagement. Beneath that language, however, the summit functioned largely as a strategic negotiation over multiple interconnected pressures unfolding simultaneously across the international system. Washington sought Chinese cooperation in reducing tensions around Iran, stabilising shipping routes through Hormuz and limiting broader geopolitical escalation. Beijing, meanwhile, approached the summit with its own priorities surrounding Taiwan, trade restrictions, semiconductor controls and long-term regional influence. Neither side fully trusted the other, yet both recognised they could not completely isolate themselves from the consequences of confrontation either.
This creates a geopolitical environment increasingly defined not by alignment, but by managed rivalry. The structure emerging today differs in important ways from the Cold War framework often used to describe growing tensions between the United States and China. During the Cold War, competing blocs were comparatively separated economically and institutionally. Today’s major powers remain deeply interconnected through trade, finance, technology and supply chains while simultaneously competing over influence, security and strategic positioning. Cooperation and confrontation increasingly occur at the same time and often within the same negotiation. That contradiction is becoming visible across nearly every major strategic sector. Artificial intelligence, for example, featured prominently around the summit not simply because of technological competition, but because AI is increasingly viewed as a foundation of future geopolitical power itself. Advanced computing infrastructure, semiconductor access, data systems and AI models are no longer treated primarily as commercial issues. They are increasingly linked directly to military capability, industrial resilience, surveillance capacity and long-term state influence. This marks a broader transformation in the relationship between technology and geopolitics. For years, digital infrastructure was framed primarily through the language of innovation and economic growth. Increasingly, however, states view technological ecosystems through the language of security, resilience and strategic vulnerability. Control over advanced technologies now shapes perceptions of national power in ways comparable to industrial capacity or military strength during earlier eras. The presence of major technology executives surrounding the summit reinforced this shift symbolically. Figures associated with artificial intelligence, semiconductors and global manufacturing are appearing more frequently alongside geopolitical negotiations because economic infrastructure and strategic competition are becoming increasingly intertwined. Governments are no longer simply regulating markets externally. They are actively shaping technological ecosystems as instruments of geopolitical influence.
At the same time, the summit highlighted changing perceptions of relative power within the international system. Several international observers noted that Beijing entered the talks appearing more strategically patient and internally confident than during earlier periods of confrontation with Washington. China increasingly presents itself as a stable actor operating within an unstable international environment, while the United States appears simultaneously militarily dominant and strategically overstretched. That perception matters because influence increasingly depends not only on raw power, but on the ability to project continuity and predictability. Governments, corporations and markets are searching less for ideological leadership than for actors capable of managing disorder without generating additional instability. In periods of prolonged geopolitical tension, predictability itself becomes a strategic asset. This broader context helps explain why the Iran crisis has become far more geopolitically significant than a conventional regional confrontation. What initially appeared to be a conflict centred on shipping disruption and energy markets has gradually evolved into a wider geopolitical stress point pulling multiple powers into overlapping negotiations. The Strait of Hormuz is no longer functioning solely as a maritime chokepoint. Increasingly, it operates as a political infrastructure through which influence can be exercised across the broader international system. Iran appears increasingly aware of this transformation. Discussions surrounding shipping restrictions, transit fees and controlled access through Hormuz suggest Tehran is moving beyond simple military escalation toward a strategy based on structured leverage. Rather than relying entirely on threats of closure, Iran is experimenting with methods of transforming instability itself into political influence. That shift reflects a larger transformation taking place across global politics. Strategic chokepoints are no longer viewed merely as vulnerabilities requiring military protection. They are increasingly becoming instruments through which states shape negotiations, influence economic behaviour and alter geopolitical relationships. The same logic increasingly appears around semiconductor production in Taiwan, undersea internet cables, Arctic shipping routes and critical mineral supply chains. Geography is returning to international politics not simply as territory, but as leverage embedded within interconnected systems.
The responses from other powers reveal growing awareness of this reality. Europe, Japan and regional Gulf states are all recalibrating assumptions surrounding energy exposure, maritime security and technological dependence. Naval coordination efforts are expanding, diplomatic engagement is intensifying and logistical infrastructure is increasingly treated as a strategic issue rather than purely a commercial one. Yet what makes the current period distinctive is not merely the return of competition itself. Competition between states has always existed. What distinguishes the present moment is the absence of a stable framework capable of containing overlapping tensions consistently. During earlier periods of geopolitical rivalry, institutions and alliances often provided relatively clear structures through which competition operated. Today, the international system appears simultaneously interconnected and fragmented. Trade continues. Diplomacy continues. Globalisation continues. Yet all increasingly function under conditions of strategic distrust. This helps explain why international politics increasingly revolves around highly personalised relationships between political leaders themselves. As institutional consensus weakens, direct communication between major powers becomes more important because there are fewer stable mechanisms available for managing disputes automatically. The Trump–Xi summit reflected this dynamic clearly. The emphasis on personal diplomacy, symbolic gestures and leader-to-leader communication was not simply stylistic. It reflected a system increasingly dependent on direct political management rather than durable institutional coordination. That dependence creates both flexibility and fragility simultaneously. Major powers can negotiate pragmatically and respond quickly to emerging crises, yet outcomes also become more unpredictable because they rely heavily on personalities, domestic political calculations and short-term strategic interests rather than institutional continuity.
This broader environment is reshaping the meaning of international order itself. For decades, many policymakers assumed that interdependence would gradually encourage convergence between major powers. Instead, interdependence has increasingly become a source of vulnerability, leverage and strategic competition. States remain deeply connected economically while becoming more cautious politically and more defensive strategically. As a result, governments are beginning to reorganise around resilience rather than optimisation alone. Supply chains are becoming more regionalised, industrial policy is returning, and strategic autonomy is gaining political importance across multiple regions simultaneously. The objective is no longer simply growth through openness, but stability under conditions of uncertainty. The implications of this transformation extend far beyond the immediate news cycle. A world increasingly managed through direct bargaining between major powers behaves differently from one organised primarily through institutions and predictable rules. Smaller states become more exposed to pressure, crises become more interconnected and geopolitical tensions become harder to isolate geographically or diplomatically. This does not necessarily mean the collapse of the international system. In many respects, the system remains remarkably resilient. Trade continues functioning, financial markets remain operational and diplomatic channels remain active despite growing geopolitical pressure. Yet resilience should not be confused with stability. Increasingly, the system functions through continuous management rather than underlying consensus. That distinction may ultimately define the next phase of global politics.
The most important lesson from the past week is therefore not whether the Trump–Xi summit succeeded or failed in narrow diplomatic terms. It is that the world increasingly expects major powers themselves to manage instability directly because existing frameworks appear less capable of independently containing overlapping crises. That expectation alone reveals how profoundly the structure of international politics is changing.
References:
Reuters — Trump–Xi summit and negotiations over Iran, trade and global tensions
The Guardian — Trump–Xi summit, AI competition and geopolitical bargaining
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/15/trump-china-visit-iran-agreement-xi-jinping-elusive
Al Jazeera — U.S.–China disagreements following summit discussions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/15/trump-xi-summit-china-us-disagree-on-what-they-agreed-on
Washington Post — China’s strategic positioning and diplomacy
Qazinform — Trade, technology and Iran on the summit agenda
https://qazinform.com/news/trade-tech-iran-top-agenda-at-trump-xi-summit-6967e8
New York Post — Trump statements following summit discussions
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