Sunday Essay 22 | 2026

One of the defining characteristics of the current international system is that instability is no longer being treated as a temporary interruption to global order. Increasingly, instability itself is becoming managed, negotiated and incorporated into how major powers operate. The past week illustrated this transformation clearly. Headlines surrounding the Trump–Xi summit, negotiations with Iran, renewed discussions over the Strait of Hormuz and debates surrounding artificial intelligence and technological infrastructure all pointed toward the same underlying reality: the world is moving away from an era built around stable systems and toward one increasingly dependent on continuous crisis management between major powers.

For decades after the Cold War, the dominant assumption shaping global politics was that interdependence would gradually reduce the likelihood of sustained geopolitical fragmentation. Markets integrated, supply chains expanded and digital infrastructure connected economies together with unprecedented speed. Institutions, trade networks and financial systems were expected to create enough mutual dependence that large-scale confrontation between major powers would remain economically irrational. Stability became embedded into the assumptions underpinning globalisation itself. Disruption certainly occurred, but it was generally viewed as temporary — something the broader international system would eventually absorb and stabilise around.

That assumption has weakened dramatically over the past several years.

What is emerging instead is a world where instability persists for long enough that states, corporations and institutions begin adapting around it rather than attempting to eliminate it completely. The significance of the current moment lies not simply in the number of overlapping crises, but in how the international system increasingly behaves in response to them. Governments are no longer operating as though tensions will disappear quickly. Instead, they are reorganising around the expectation that geopolitical disruption may become a permanent feature of international politics rather than a temporary deviation from normality.

The evolving negotiations surrounding Iran illustrate this shift particularly well. Reports this week suggested that a draft framework between Washington and Tehran is approaching completion, potentially reopening the Strait of Hormuz and establishing a temporary ceasefire structure after months of escalating confrontation. Yet what stands out about the negotiations is not necessarily optimism surrounding a lasting peace agreement. Rather, it is the extent to which both sides appear focused on managing instability rather than resolving the underlying conflict entirely.

The proposed agreements reportedly involve temporary arrangements, phased negotiations and delayed discussions surrounding the most difficult issues, particularly Iran’s nuclear programme and regional proxy networks. In other words, the objective increasingly appears to be preventing uncontrolled escalation rather than achieving deep strategic reconciliation. The international system is learning to function through provisional management instead of durable settlement.

That distinction matters because it changes how global politics operates. During earlier periods of relative stability, institutions and treaties were often designed around permanence. Agreements sought to create predictable frameworks capable of enduring across multiple political cycles. Today, however, diplomacy increasingly resembles continuous crisis containment. Ceasefires become temporary pauses rather than definitive conclusions. Trade agreements become flexible bargaining mechanisms rather than stable economic foundations. Strategic partnerships become transactional and situational rather than ideologically fixed.

The Trump–Xi summit reflected this transformation clearly. Publicly, both sides framed the meeting around cooperation and stabilisation. In practice, however, the summit revealed how deeply interconnected and simultaneously fragile the international system has become. Iran, trade, Taiwan, semiconductor restrictions, artificial intelligence and maritime security all became intertwined within the same broader strategic negotiation.

This convergence matters because geopolitical crises are no longer compartmentalised. The United States cannot discuss Iran separately from China because Beijing remains central to global manufacturing, energy markets and technological supply chains. China cannot fully isolate itself from Middle Eastern instability because its economic system remains deeply dependent on energy flows moving through Hormuz. Technology negotiations cannot be separated from military considerations because AI infrastructure and semiconductor access increasingly shape defence capability and long-term state power simultaneously.

As a result, major powers increasingly manage overlapping tensions within one interconnected geopolitical environment rather than through isolated diplomatic channels. Cooperation and confrontation occur simultaneously, often within the same negotiation. The world is becoming less structured around fixed blocs and more organised around continuous bargaining between powerful states attempting to stabilise overlapping vulnerabilities.

This creates a geopolitical environment defined less by resolution than by managed uncertainty.

That uncertainty extends beyond diplomacy into the infrastructure underpinning modern globalisation itself. One of the clearest signals emerging over recent weeks is that infrastructure has become central terrain within geopolitical competition. Shipping corridors, undersea internet cables, semiconductor supply chains, AI infrastructure and energy systems are no longer treated merely as technical or commercial assets. Increasingly, they are viewed as instruments of geopolitical leverage.

Iran’s position around the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates this clearly. The significance of Hormuz lies not simply in its geographic location, but in the extent to which global systems remain dependent on uninterrupted movement through it. Even partial disruption produces global consequences because modern economies rely heavily on concentrated infrastructure networks operating continuously and predictably. That dependency creates leverage for states positioned near strategic chokepoints regardless of whether they possess overwhelming military or economic power themselves.

The same logic increasingly applies elsewhere. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has become geopolitically critical because advanced economies depend heavily on concentrated chip production. Undersea cables have become strategic assets because they underpin financial systems, communications and digital infrastructure globally. Arctic shipping routes are gaining geopolitical importance because climate and trade shifts are altering long-term logistical calculations. The systems enabling globalisation are becoming visible as strategic vulnerabilities rather than invisible background infrastructure.

This shift is gradually reshaping how governments define security itself. For decades, economic efficiency dominated strategic planning. Supply chains expanded globally, production concentrated in specialised regions and digital infrastructure prioritised speed, scale and integration. Increasingly, however, governments are reorganising around resilience rather than optimisation alone. Strategic redundancy, domestic production capacity and infrastructure control are becoming political priorities because states no longer assume uninterrupted stability can be guaranteed indefinitely.

China’s behaviour reflects this transformation particularly well. Beijing’s long-term investments in semiconductor independence, industrial policy, digital infrastructure and alternative trade corridors increasingly appear designed not simply for economic growth, but for survivability under conditions of geopolitical fragmentation. At the same time, Washington is responding through export restrictions, supply-chain partnerships and technology controls aimed at limiting China’s access to strategically critical systems.

What emerges is a world where geopolitical competition increasingly revolves around managing exposure to vulnerability rather than pursuing dominance through traditional military means alone. States are attempting to reduce dependence on systems they no longer fully trust while remaining deeply interconnected economically at the same time. This creates a paradoxical international environment: globalisation continues, yet governments increasingly prepare for disruption within it.

The result is not deglobalisation in a simple sense. Trade continues. Diplomacy continues. Financial systems remain interconnected. Yet globalisation itself is becoming more conditional, more politically filtered and more strategically managed. Stability is no longer assumed automatically. It increasingly depends on continuous negotiation between major actors attempting to prevent overlapping crises from spiralling simultaneously.

This is why the current moment feels fundamentally different from earlier periods of geopolitical tension. During the post–Cold War era, instability was often perceived as temporary disruption interrupting an otherwise stable trajectory toward deeper integration. Today, instability increasingly appears structural. Governments, corporations and markets are adapting around the expectation that uncertainty itself may persist indefinitely.

That adaptation changes political behaviour. Governments become more interventionist economically. Supply chains become more regionalised. Industrial policy returns. Strategic autonomy becomes politically attractive because dependence increasingly feels dangerous. Institutions remain important, but states rely more heavily on direct bargaining and flexible coalitions because stable consensus becomes harder to sustain across a fragmented international environment.

This broader shift also changes the meaning of power itself. Influence increasingly depends not only on military strength or economic size, but on the ability to maintain continuity within unstable conditions. Predictability becomes a strategic asset. States capable of managing disorder without amplifying it gain influence because governments, corporations and markets increasingly prioritise resilience over ideological alignment.

That dynamic helps explain why major-power diplomacy now appears highly personalised around political leaders themselves. As institutional frameworks weaken, direct communication between powerful states becomes more important because fewer automatic mechanisms exist for containing crises independently. The Trump–Xi summit reflected precisely this reality. The emphasis on leader-to-leader engagement was not merely symbolic. It reflected an international system increasingly dependent on direct management between major powers because existing frameworks appear less capable of stabilising overlapping crises on their own.

The broader consequence is an international order functioning through continuous management rather than durable consensus. This does not necessarily mean collapse. In many ways, the system remains remarkably resilient. Trade still flows, markets continue operating and diplomacy remains active despite growing geopolitical pressure. Yet resilience should not be mistaken for stability. Increasingly, the system functions because states are constantly intervening, negotiating and recalibrating in response to persistent tension.

That may ultimately become the defining characteristic of the emerging global order.

The most important signal from the past week is therefore not simply whether negotiations with Iran succeed, whether Trump and Xi achieved substantive breakthroughs or whether tensions around Hormuz ease temporarily. It is that the world increasingly appears organised around the management of instability itself. Governments are adapting not to the expectation of restored stability, but to the expectation that instability may become permanent enough to require continuous strategic management.

And that represents a profound shift in how international politics now functions.

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