Sunday Essay 27 | 2026
Taiwan, Ukraine and the Middle East Reveal Why Strategic Resilience Is Redefining State Power
SUNDAY ESSAYS
6/28/2026
For much of the post-Cold War era, governments largely viewed resilience as a consequence of prosperity rather than a strategic objective in its own right. If economies continued growing, trade expanded across borders and political institutions remained stable, resilience was expected to emerge naturally. Countries that became wealthier would possess stronger public finances, more capable institutions and greater resources with which to respond to future crises. Security remained important, but increasingly it was treated as one component of a broader international system built upon economic integration, open markets and diplomatic cooperation.
That assumption shaped policymaking for more than three decades. Governments prioritised efficiency because efficiency appeared to reinforce stability. Manufacturing shifted towards regions offering lower production costs. Supply chains stretched across continents. Energy imports were judged primarily through commercial considerations, while technological cooperation increasingly transcended geopolitical boundaries. International institutions expanded alongside global markets, creating a widespread belief that deep economic interdependence would reduce strategic confrontation. Stability was no longer expected to depend primarily upon military power or national self-sufficiency, but upon the continued functioning of an increasingly interconnected global economy.
The historical context helps explain why this approach proved so persuasive. The decades immediately following the Cold War were remarkably unusual by historical standards. Europe experienced one of its most peaceful and economically integrated periods in centuries. China’s extraordinary economic rise transformed global manufacturing while simultaneously lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty. International trade grew faster than global output, multinational companies became genuinely global enterprises and technological innovation accelerated communication between governments, businesses and societies. For many policymakers, history appeared to be moving towards greater integration rather than renewed geopolitical competition.
This environment encouraged a subtle but important shift in how governments understood power itself. During much of the twentieth century, national strength had largely been measured through industrial capacity, military production and territorial security. By contrast, the post-Cold War decades rewarded competitiveness, innovation and economic openness. Success increasingly depended upon attracting investment, participating in global markets and specialising within international supply chains. Governments became exceptionally good at making systems efficient because efficiency generated measurable economic returns. The possibility that those same systems might one day become strategic vulnerabilities often received comparatively little attention.
The past several years have steadily challenged that assumption. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of highly concentrated supply chains. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europe to reconsider decades of energy policy almost overnight. Tensions surrounding Taiwan reminded governments that the world’s most advanced semiconductor production remains geographically concentrated in one of the most strategically sensitive regions on Earth. Disruptions in the Red Sea and recurring concerns surrounding the Strait of Hormuz demonstrated that global trade still depends upon a limited number of maritime chokepoints. None of these developments occurred in isolation. Together, they forced governments to ask whether systems designed primarily for efficiency were sufficiently prepared for an era defined increasingly by geopolitical competition.
The answer emerging across many capitals appears remarkably consistent. Efficiency remains desirable, but resilience is becoming indispensable. Governments are not abandoning globalisation, nor are they attempting to reverse decades of economic integration. Rather, they are reassessing how much strategic risk can be embedded within highly optimised systems before those systems become liabilities. The objective is no longer simply to maximise growth under favourable conditions. Increasingly, it is to ensure that growth, security and political stability can be sustained when conditions become considerably less favourable.
This week’s developments illustrate that transformation with unusual clarity. Consider Taiwan. Reports that the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany jointly expressed concern over increased Chinese military activity around Taiwan’s eastern coast are significant not because conflict has begun, but because governments increasingly believe that deterrence begins long before the first military confrontation. Political signalling, diplomatic coordination and alliance reassurance are no longer merely responses to crises. They have become instruments designed to prevent crises from emerging in the first place. Strategic resilience therefore begins with preserving stability rather than restoring it after it has been lost.
A similar evolution is visible within economic policy. China’s continued restrictions on exports of strategically important minerals to Japan highlight how governments increasingly understand supply chains as instruments of geopolitical influence. During earlier decades, access to critical materials was largely viewed as a commercial issue governed by markets and comparative advantage. Today, the same discussion revolves around strategic exposure, industrial resilience and national security. Governments are investing in alternative suppliers, encouraging domestic production and strengthening cooperation with trusted partners because they increasingly accept that economic dependence can produce geopolitical vulnerability. The discussion has shifted from efficiency towards redundancy, diversification and long-term resilience.
Diplomacy reflects the same pattern. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s meetings with Gulf leaders amid continuing uncertainty surrounding Iran demonstrate that modern diplomacy increasingly focuses on maintaining confidence rather than merely resolving disputes. Alliances depend upon reassurance just as much as formal agreements. Governments now devote considerable effort to preserving political trust before uncertainty develops into instability. The continuing dialogue surrounding Iran similarly illustrates that engagement is increasingly valued not because it guarantees agreement, but because sustained communication reduces the likelihood of strategic surprise. Diplomacy itself is becoming an instrument of resilience rather than simply a mechanism for ending crises.
These developments may appear distinct, yet they reflect a common strategic adjustment. Governments are gradually recognising that resilience cannot simply be improvised after disruption occurs. It must be built in advance through political relationships, diversified supply chains, resilient institutions and sustained investment in capabilities that may appear expensive during periods of stability but become invaluable when conditions deteriorate. The post-Cold War model assumed that interconnected systems would naturally generate resilience. The emerging model suggests resilience must instead be deliberately designed into those systems from the outset.
Perhaps the most significant implication is that governments are beginning to redefine preparedness itself. Preparedness no longer refers solely to military readiness or emergency planning. It increasingly encompasses economic diversification, technological sovereignty, infrastructure protection, diplomatic flexibility and institutional adaptability. Security policy, industrial strategy and economic policy are becoming more closely connected because policymakers increasingly understand that modern crises rarely remain confined to a single domain. A disruption beginning in trade can quickly become a security issue. A regional conflict can affect global energy markets within days. Climate events increasingly influence infrastructure, healthcare systems and economic productivity simultaneously. As these boundaries blur, resilience evolves from a specialised policy objective into a broader organising principle shaping national strategy.
The post-Cold War world rewarded countries that became more interconnected. The emerging international environment increasingly rewards those capable of remaining connected while simultaneously becoming more resilient. That distinction may appear subtle, yet it represents one of the most important strategic adjustments now taking place across international politics. Rather than preparing for a world where disruption is exceptional, governments increasingly appear to be preparing for one in which disruption becomes a recurring feature of international affairs rather than a temporary interruption.
The consequences of this shift are becoming increasingly visible across multiple regions. NATO provides a particularly revealing example. During much of the Cold War, alliance cohesion largely rested upon the existence of a common strategic threat. While disagreements certainly occurred, the broader geopolitical environment provided a clear organising principle. Today’s alliance operates under far more complex conditions. Member states possess different domestic political priorities, varying economic relationships with China and differing assessments of future security risks. Consequently, maintaining political cohesion has become a strategic objective in its own right. Reports surrounding Secretary General Mark Rutte’s efforts to balance relations between President Trump and the alliance’s European members illustrate that resilience is no longer measured solely through military capability. It increasingly depends upon preserving political trust and institutional cohesion before disagreements undermine collective decision-making.
The war in Ukraine continues reinforcing many of these lessons simultaneously. Earlier phases of the conflict focused primarily on territorial gains, battlefield movements and military equipment. Increasingly, however, the conflict has evolved into a contest of endurance. Ukrainian operations targeting infrastructure in Crimea demonstrate an effort to reduce Russia’s long-term operational capacity rather than simply secure tactical victories. Equally, Russia continues attempting to degrade Ukraine’s economic resilience, energy infrastructure and industrial capacity. Modern conflict increasingly extends beyond conventional military objectives. Success depends upon preserving logistics, communications, industrial production and public confidence over prolonged periods. Defence planners increasingly recognise that resilience is not simply the ability to survive a crisis. It is the ability to continue functioning effectively while the crisis persists.
The Middle East illustrates another important dimension of this transition. Discussions surrounding Iran, regional diplomacy and continued engagement between Gulf states demonstrate that governments increasingly distinguish between solving geopolitical disputes and managing them. During earlier decades, diplomatic success was often defined by comprehensive agreements intended to resolve underlying disagreements. Contemporary diplomacy appears more pragmatic. Governments increasingly recognise that some disputes may persist for years, yet still require continuous engagement to prevent escalation. Maintaining communication, preserving regional confidence and reducing uncertainty have become strategic objectives because they strengthen resilience even when complete political agreement remains unattainable. Stability is increasingly understood as something that must be managed continuously rather than achieved permanently.
The same logic extends beyond traditional security policy into domestic governance and economic planning. Governments increasingly evaluate infrastructure, energy systems, healthcare capacity, telecommunications and digital networks according to their ability to withstand prolonged disruption rather than their efficiency under ideal conditions. The record temperatures experienced across parts of Europe this week provide a useful example. Extreme weather events are no longer treated solely as environmental challenges. They increasingly influence labour productivity, transport networks, healthcare systems, electricity demand and long-term public investment. Climate resilience therefore becomes inseparable from economic resilience, illustrating how national security itself has broadened beyond conventional military definitions.
An equally important transformation concerns the position of middle powers. Large economies possess significant financial resources, diversified industrial bases and greater capacity to absorb shocks through scale alone. Smaller and medium-sized states rarely enjoy those advantages. Countries such as Finland, Poland, Singapore, South Korea and several Gulf states increasingly demonstrate that resilience can be built through different means: diversified economic partnerships, credible institutions, technological investment, diplomatic flexibility and carefully constructed alliances. Rather than competing through size, they compete through adaptability. Their experience suggests that resilience is not exclusively a function of national wealth or military expenditure. It also reflects the ability to adjust rapidly when geopolitical conditions change.
This evolution is beginning to reshape how governments understand national power. For decades, policymakers frequently assessed strength through economic output, population size or military spending. Those indicators remain important, yet they no longer capture the full picture. Increasingly, governments ask whether supply chains can continue operating if trade routes are disrupted, whether critical industries can sustain production during prolonged crises and whether institutions can maintain public confidence under sustained pressure. These questions measure endurance rather than expansion. They assess whether societies can continue functioning effectively when confronted by repeated shocks rather than how efficiently they operate when conditions remain favourable.
The implications extend well beyond governments themselves. Investors increasingly evaluate political stability and institutional resilience alongside economic performance. Businesses reassess supply chains not only according to cost but also according to geopolitical exposure. International organisations increasingly devote attention to preparedness, redundancy and crisis management rather than assuming global integration alone will guarantee stability. Resilience is therefore becoming an organising principle across public and private decision-making alike. Economic competitiveness remains essential, yet it is increasingly judged alongside the capacity to withstand disruption without suffering long-term strategic damage.
None of this suggests that the post-Cold War model has failed entirely. Open markets, international trade and diplomatic cooperation remain indispensable components of the global economy. Governments continue recognising the enormous benefits generated through international integration. What appears to be changing is the balance between efficiency and resilience. The objective is no longer to maximise one at the expense of the other. Instead, policymakers increasingly seek systems capable of combining openness with durability, recognising that prosperity itself depends upon societies remaining resilient during periods of geopolitical uncertainty.
The defining signal emerging from this week’s developments is therefore not simply that tensions persist around Taiwan, that the war in Ukraine continues or that instability remains a feature of the Middle East. Those headlines are important, but they point towards a broader transformation already reshaping international politics. Governments increasingly recognise that resilience cannot be improvised after disruption begins. It must be built deliberately through investment, strategic planning and sustained political commitment long before crises fully materialise.
For much of the post-Cold War era, prosperity was widely viewed as the foundation upon which security and stability would naturally rest. Recent years suggest that the relationship is becoming increasingly reciprocal. Prosperity still matters enormously, but sustaining it now depends upon resilient institutions, diversified economies, secure supply chains, adaptable diplomacy and societies capable of absorbing repeated shocks without losing strategic direction. In that sense, resilience is no longer simply another policy objective competing for political attention. It is gradually becoming one of the defining measures of state power in the twenty-first century. The governments most likely to succeed in the decades ahead may therefore not be those that optimise most aggressively during periods of stability, but those that remain most capable of adapting when stability can no longer be taken for granted.
References:
Taiwan, China & Strategic Competition
• Reuters — US, UK, France, Germany raise alarm about Chinese patrols off eastern Taiwan
• Bloomberg — Xi Pressures Takaichi by Throttling Key Mineral Exports to Japan
Ukraine, NATO & European Security
• Politico — Rutte’s balancing act between Trump and 31 NATO allies
https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/24/rutte-nato-trump-allies-00972952
• Financial Times — Crimea’s big cities in total blackout after Ukrainian drone strikes
https://www.ft.com/content/7107a1c1-8025-4237-947f-40fa39c9d2fe
• The Independent — Why is Putin asking for Ukraine-Russia peace talks now?
Middle East, Diplomacy & Regional Stability
• Reuters — Rubio meets Gulf leaders, pledges security amid Iran deal doubts
• BBC News — Israeli troops kill two in south Lebanon after lull in fighting, authorities say
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c36ykpw0yego
• The Washington Post — Israel deliberately targeted Palestinian children in Gaza, U.N. commission says
Resilience, Intelligence & Strategic Preparedness
• Associated Press — Iranian agents lived in Australia before directing attacks on Sydney and Melbourne, spy chief says
https://apnews.com/article/australia-iran-attacks-sydney-melbourne-d757a2bc2aa540ddff9f6164343e7705
• Reuters — EU hosts Taliban officials in Brussels for first time
• Reuters — Three Pakistani rangers killed in Karachi attack, Dawn newspaper reports
Climate, Infrastructure & Long-Term Adaptation
• BBC News — France, UK and Spain see record temperatures as heatwave grips western Europe
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